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The premise of this Strategy Research Project is the execution of the Global War on
Terror depends on cohesive units and current mobilization policy and practices that have negatively impacted unit cohesion. The definition of cohesion used for this project is that of "social cohesion" or trust based on shared successes during training and operations.
Much of this information about mobilization and unit cohesion has been gathered over a period of years in a hard working cell residing in the basement of the Pentagon and propagated via multiple briefings developed there.
Law, Policy, Practices Law
The law for Partial Mobilization, which is the authority being used to execute the Global War on Terror, is Title 10 United States Code 12302. 10 USC 12302 stipulates a mobilization period of not more than 24 consecutive months. Remobilization means to mobilize a unit or soldier for a period more than one time, but not to exceed a total of 24 months or 730 days. The only difference between that approach and the one we are using today is that today we are cobbling together soldiers that have already been professionally trained and have volunteered to serve. Therefore, the individual soldier should be of a better quality and motivation, but the unity of a unit is still left in question.
Voluntary Mobilization
The concept of relying on Reserve Component volunteers was first put on paper on July 7 This memorandum mentions some concerns about advantages and disadvantages of using volunteers, but neither memorandum provides any guidance regarding unit integrity. There is neither concern nor consideration for such an important matter as the cohesion of units. A "donor" unit, which was whole at the beginning of the process, was required to provide volunteers to a deploying unit in order to fill the unit's demands. The vacancies in the donor unit cause it to be less effective. Due to the lack of soldiers in each of the donor units, the units are no longer ready to go to combat, degrading the overall readiness of the Reserve Component.
Ironically, the Department of Defense Directive 1235.10 stipulates volunteerism should not degrade the readiness of the units, but that is exactly what happens. Further, because each unit no longer has all its original soldiers, cohesion is negatively impacted and training effectiveness is reduced. Therefore, personnel readiness is degraded and potentially the training readiness as well. The deploying unit has all the soldiers it needs, but cohesion of that unit is not as strong as it might be if the unit had been training together all along. The illustration below depicts this process and its effects on units. In this scenario, the lack of cohesion becomes a risk. The level of risk associated with cohesion is directly proportional to the complexity of that unit's mission or purpose. For instance, a truck unit that is required to transport goods from one location to another is quite different and less complex than a truck unit that not only transports goods, but is required to provide convoy security against the likes of insurgents and Improvised Explosive Devices. Units that are required to be directly involved in combat are more reliant on a cohesive unit than those that provide services only. Napoleon astutely pointed out that "Soldiers have to eat soup together for a long time before they are ready to fight. Many of the difficulties with cross-leveling are depicted in the illustration above. As previously discussed, cross-leveling of units decreases unit cohesion even though the military has always relied on some "fillers". For instance, when units experience battle field losses the military's personnel system replaces the soldier to the unit. However, it is the degree of "fillers" that determines when a unit is negatively impacted. The degree of cross-leveling that is acceptable is contingent on the units' purpose and mission. If the unit is required to conduct any type of direct engagement mission in the course of their operation, such as convoy security then unit integrity and cohesion are a must. The cross-leveling of units not only causes stress on the donor units but also the deploying units. Whether it is a donor unit or deploying unit additional stress is felt by all members. Some of the effects on the "left behind units", more commonly known as donor units, are degrading both training and personnel readiness. This cross-leveling action also obstructs resetting and training of the unit for future deployments.
OSD-Mandated Volunteer Policy Stresses the Force

Impact of RC Cross-Leveling
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The cross-leveling action leaves units without leaders and often missing equipment or the ability to maintain the unit's equipment. Training is diminished due to the lack of participants and morale is reduced; hence, readiness deteriorates. "The National Guard alone has had to transfer over 74,000 individuals from one command to another just to fill the ranks of units with sufficient trained and qualified personnel before they deployed. Equipment shortfalls are also significant. Since 9/11, the Army has transferred over 35,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to forces in Iraq, leaving the stay-behind commands lacking more than a third of their critical equipment. 13 Family readiness groups are the epicenter for units at home station. The distance created by the need to cross-level units precludes fellowship with other families or participants in unit family events, as depicted in the picture above. Tricare issues, which are already difficult, become more difficult to address for the dependent due to the distance created by crossleveling units. All of these factors are contributors to debasing unit cohesion. Sadly, individual soldiers deployed with other units often return home to a small to non-existent celebration, whereas the unit the individuals deployed with is greeted by a warm welcome home gathering.
Unit Cohesion
Cohesion is the bond of trust between members of a group. Cohesion is achieved through shared challenges. The military provides those challenges through training and combat experience. As the unit achieves success, the confidence and trust among the members grows and a bond is formed.
Outcome-Based Cohesion
Why is unit cohesion so imperative to Army units? Unit cohesion is imperative because of the outcomes of that cohesion. The outcomes desired to be achieved include: the unit doesn't disintegrate under stress; they consistently train better and to higher standards; they require less administrative support; they provide a higher quality of life; and most importantly they fight better and suffer fewer battle and non-battle casualties. 14 Because of extensive training anxiety is reduced. Leaders know the strengths and weaknesses of their unit members. Therefore, leaders will take more appropriate risks and units will suffer fewer battle and non-battle casualties. In fact, cohesive training is integral to the successful accomplishment of any mission.
What Unit Cohesion Looks Like
As the 1949 Studebaker advertisement stated, "Success breeds success." Stability is the fiber that creates the foundation of cohesion. Stabilizing personnel naturally creates the bonding process, which forms cohesion and provides the desirable outcomes called success.
Personnel stability is a vital requirement for leaders and soldiers to achieve cohesion. Stability is the length of time that members of the group spend together, creating familiarity. Personnel stabilized and placed under stress that achieve success create an unshakable bond termed cohesion. As momentum is generated even more desirable outcomes are attained. Cohesion is a shared Army value which is demonstrated through a commitment to comrades. Achieving cohesion at all of these levels is no small task and is never taken lightly by members of the Army. However, this is a process that requires much time, a great deal of attention, and dedication to realize. During combat, a great deal depends on the fact that a unit fights as a unit
Recipe for Cohesion
and not a melding of individuals. This is a life or death situation with the attainment of the nation's interest hanging in the balance of success or failure.
What can be Expected if Unit Cohesion is not Achieved?
The Casualty numbers and mission failures are the very things media seems to focus on. Napoleon espoused concern with this matter, "Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets." 20 If left unchecked, these types of stories will likely proliferate and the will of the people will be lost. In other words, everything desired to be achieved is at risk, to include the national interests.
What is the solution?
A program titled COHORT, which stands for cohesion, operational readiness, training program was a stabilization effort tried between 1981 and 1986. 21 COHORT focused on forming and maintaining combat arms units through common themes such as, keeping soldiers together in the same unit for longer periods and curtailing unit turbulence to achieve cohesion.
COHORT units scored consistently higher on most dimensions of psychological readiness for combat. These units were able to resist potentially adverse actions such as leader turbulence, changes in equipment, and changes in fighting doctrine, organizational reconfiguration and rotation. COHORT units were consistently better at movement, maneuver, occupation, and communication skills at small-unit levels such as platoon and company. They consistently performed collective tasks and sustained themselves under stress better than conventional units. The COHORT research also determined that the potential for family unit bonding was enhanced.
There are a few options that would work, but some options are better than others. Ideally, the recommendation is to follow the current mobilization laws and permit the Reserve Component to manage its units and personnel as they see most fitting. This would permit the Reserve Component to employ their units just as they exist today, requiring far less crossleveling and allowing units to remain intact. The difficulty with this option is that units will have some soldiers that were previously mobilized going back to a combat zone while other members will be experiencing deployment for the first time. This situation is not insurmountable. It is not uncommon for members of units in the Army National Guard to be together for many years, perhaps even nine or ten years in one unit. The type of cohesion created over that period of time can not be under valued. Another possibility is to use the current SECDEF policy of a cumulative 24 month period. This would require a change to the SECDEF's current practice of "one and done," meaning that mobilizing for a period of time that could range from a few months to 18 months and when that is completed you can no longer be mobilized for GWOT again.
This would permit a larger population of soldiers that exist in units to deploy together, but not all soldiers could be used from the unit. For instance, soldiers who have already mobilized for 24 months would not be eligible unless they go as volunteers. Also, it would be foolish to remobilize soldiers who have mobilized for more than six months previously since they would not be able to complete the mission with the unit within the allotted 24 months. The choice that 
Conclusion
In the earlier stages of the Global War on Terror the plan was for a war of short duration and with far less troops than we are experiencing today. It is now known that the Global War on
Terror has been and will be a long war. The current troop level is considerably higher than planned for this stage of the operation and was just recently raised an additional 20,000
soldiers. The need for more soldiers in theater is apparent. The United States President has also seen the need to increase the Army's Active Component and Marine Corps which should assist overcoming the shortfall. But this measure will not completely remedy the need. The current mitigations are degrading both the deployed units and the donor units. In order to renounce the use of these harmful mitigations, using the Reserve Component forces again is necessary.
Because we are in a long war that has already lasted over five years and the stress is being felt across all military branches and components, a change is required for continued 
